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  The purpose of this paper is to investigate the scheme of the pension reform launched 
in Russia in 2002 and its implementation in subsequent years. Analyses are made from a 
viewpoint of the political economy and from the demographic and financial perspectives. In 
Section 2, the background of pension reforms is described. In Section 3, the legislation and 
implementation processes of the pension reform of 2002 are discussed. In Section 4, statistical 
analyses are given from demographic and financial perspectives.
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2 Background of pension reforms   
2-1 Socio-economic situation in the 1990s   
Russian pensioners were one of the hardest hit victims of the radical transformation 
that occurred under President Boris Yeltsin. People were faced with hyperinflation, an 
unprecedented drop in production and real income, and mass unemployment. In the Soviet era, 
the Socialist pension system, although containing many shortcomings, served as a stabilizing 
force for the Soviet society as a whole, and especially for the working masses and elderly 
people.  
The old Soviet pension system, however, was already suffering from a “socialist 
disease” at the time of Perestroika, and it was almost dead in the mid-1990s. The causes of this 
fatal disease were threefold: (1) the socialist system, (2) a shock of transitions, (3) the aging of 
the population.   
These were accompanied by a series of symptoms such as delay or non-payment of 
pensions. We could say that this was due to a breach of state laws by the state itself. The state 
became insolvent in the process of systemic changes, and as a result the state pension system 
ceased to function.
3 As shown in Table 2, the average pension in real terms decreased 
                                                      
1 Professor, Faculty of Economics, Osaka Sangyo University; and Professor, Slavic Research 
Center, Hokkaido University. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the International 
Workshop on Economics of Intergenerational Equity in Transition Economies March 10-11, 
2005 in Kunitachi, Tokyo. 
2 As shown in Table 3, although there are several kinds of pensions in Russia as in the other 
countries of the world, we mostly concentrate ourselves on old-age pensions throughout this 
paper.  
3  For the details of this process, see Afanasiev (2003), Ohtsu (2002a and 2002b), Kuboniwa and  
  2
significantly in the 1990s, and in 1999 it fell to only 31.4 percent of the 1991 value.   
Some efforts, however, were made to alleviate the problems. In 1990, before the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, a new Russian state pension law was put into effect apart from the 
Soviet law, and based on this, a new institution called “Pension Fund of Russia (PFR)” was set 
up as an off-budget special fund. 
In addition, there were two occasions in the 1990s when the Yeltsin government 
seriously tried to institute substantial reforms in the pension system. First, in 1995, the 
Government worked out the “Concepts of the Pension System Reform in the Russian 
Federation,” which included the idea of setting up a three-pillar pension system for the first time 
in Russia. However, this “Concept” was not realized. Second, in 1998, a new “Pension Reform 
Program” was publicized. It included a plan of introducing a funded mechanism to finance 
retirement pensions. This program was relatively well designed and had a very good “road map” 
to guide it to completion, but it didn’t last long enough to be materialized because of the 
financial crisis that took place in August of that year.   
In the meantime, as these systemic reforms were abortive, the only remedy the 
Government adopted was to increase the amount of pensions, mostly as a political compromise. 
It was obvious that as the Government continued to pay more based on the old scheme, and 
accordingly as the tax burden became heavier, the contradictions between the pension system 
and social welfare grew rapidly. Despite those results, this was the characteristic trait of pension 
policies in the 1990s under the Yeltsin government.   
 
2-2 Putin’s reforms   
It was only when President Putin took office in 2000 that a new reform cycle took 
hold. Based on the advice of Minister of Economy German Grev’s strategy of structural reforms, 
Putin openly declared the start of his pension reforms. In the autumn of 2000, a new and revised 
“Pension Reform Program in the Russian Federation” was made public, and pension reforms 
became one of the biggest political agendas for Russian society as a whole. The Government 
intended to introduce a new retirement pension formula as one of the most important elements 
of the new program. It consisted of the basic pension, the insured pension, and the funded 
pension, collectively comprising the three-pillar system. This formula has been one of the core 
problems in Russian pension reforms. 
In the spring of 2001, the creation of the National Council for pension system reforms 
was called for by the President. This Council was a sort of political device designed by Putin 
and institutionalized in order to consolidate all social forces and to reconcile opposing opinions 
to the realization of pension reforms in Russia. This Council was headed by Prime Minister 
                                                                                                                                                            
Tabata (2002) and Tabata (2002).  
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Mikhail Kas’ianov, and its members included almost all leaders of parliamentary factions 
together with heads of a number of social organizations such as independent labor unions. This 
Council provided one of the major stages of “reform drama” and of open debates for the main 
pension reform actors.   
The first Council, originally scheduled for March 6, started its work on May 19 to 
discuss a draft of a law on basic pension insurance. The original draft proposed by the PFR 
was not designed as a final one, but a more or less transitional one. The Ministry of 
Economic Development and Trade, however, did not share this position and was inclined to 
construct a new system with a long life, because a transitional plan, they thought, would 
sooner or later become impracticable due to a shortage of funds. This difference in 
approaches represented an inherent disagreement between the two parties. According to the 
program in the autumn of 2000, new pension laws were to be put into effect from the 
beginning of 2002. Thus, in order to achieve this target, this large disagreement between the 
parties must be resolved at least by the summer of 2001.   
On the stage of pension “reform drama,” three people played major roles. The first 
was Mikhail Dmitriev, Deputy Minister of Economic Development and Trade, who was a 
protagonist of radical market-oriented reforms. Dmitriev was strongly supported by German 
Grev, Minister of this Ministry, the chief navigator of structural reform policy of the Putin 
government. Mikhail Dmitriev had a doctorate in economics specializing in economic 
cybernetics, and he enjoyed a strong reputation as a top specialist of labor and pension 
systems. 
The second person in the “drama” was Mikhail Zurabov. He was also a noted 
specialist in the field of pension business, and he represented the vested interests of the PFR, 
i.e., a huge bureaucratic structure with more than ten thousand personnel working all over 
Russia. It was quite understandable that Zurabov and his colleagues did not welcome radical 
reforms. 
Lastly was Prime Minister Mikhail Kas’ianov, who, under pressure from President 
Putin, was eager to finish reforms as quickly as possible. His main job was to urge the 
Dmitriev and Zurabov to find a compromise to reach a solution. He had a strong adviser, 
Evgenii Gontmakher, another specialist on social and labor policy, who worked as a regular 
secretary of the National Council for pension reforms. While Gontmakher was publicly 
regarded as belonging to the radical reformist school, because of his official position he 
served more as a moderator for Dmitriev and Zurabov. 
Among these three figures, Zurabov was the key person. First, he was the man 
responsible for proposing a basic text of new laws on pension reforms. Second, he was a 
militant fighter against radicalism, representing the interests of the Ministry of Labor and  
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Social Development which had been a nest for the old “labor bureaucrats.” In the course of 
meetings of the National Council, on many occasions, Mikhail Zurabov’s proposals for a 
new draft law or his interpretation of them received cool and critical comments from 
Mikhail Dmitriev, followed by harsh debates which often resulted in a deadlock. This 
spectacle was repeated quite often, because a deep, specialist knowledge to understand the 
problems at issue was needed. As a result, many issues were left to the hands of both party 
specialists to seek compromises behind the scenes.   
On April 17, the second Council was convened, and the discussion on the new 
reform program and corresponding legislation of six laws was launched. During the course 
of discussions on the proposed draft laws, article by article, it became clear that the criticism 
by the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade was still very strong against Zurabov’s 
version. Consequently, the gapbetween these parties needed to be filled with every effort 
before the next meeting.   
After the April meetings, Gontmakher gave an interview to Izvestiia in which he 
expressed a grave concern overthis “unfilled gap.” He pointed out that the argument made by 
Dmitriev stressing the necessity of income disclosure, in connection with his proposal to include 
non-state pension funds and to allow investments in foreign stock markets,was problematic. 
From Gontmakher’s point of view, Dmitriev’s version would not promote the disclosure and 
would not exclude the financial crisis like the one in 1998. Generally, the population remained 
strongly worried about Dmitriev’s version.   
The problems of Russian pension reforms discussed in these years could be 
summarized into the following three areas;   
1) Simplification of various existing pension systems. 
Under the Soviet regime, various pension systems developed. Apart from labor 
pensions, there were separate pension systems for the handicapped and/or families in need of 
social assistance, for ex-soldiers, and there were also special early retirement pensions for 
those working under hazardous conditions. These pensions were created under different 
special social economic preconditions, some of which have lost importance or have become 
sources for special privileges and social unfairness. In this area, such basic concepts as 
“fairness” or “equality” must be put into question and reconsidered under new 
circumstances.  
2) Financing and calculations. 
The so-called “pay-as-you-go (PAYG) system” was not expected to work in the 
years to come and instead, a so-called “fully funded system” should be introduced and put 
into motion. Gradual implementation of this system could be recommended as one of the 
most desirable solutions. This view was, needless to say, widely accepted, but in order to  
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obtain a sort of optimal solution, so many variables had to be taken into consideration such 
as macro-economic indicators like growth rates, income growth, and demographical 
dynamics, changes in the number of economically active population and so on. It was 
extremely difficult to work out an optimal solution, particularly in a swiftly changing 
society like Russia. 
3) Non-state pension schemes. 
A new system of non-state pension schemes, including “cooperate pension funds” 
and “voluntary pension insurance,” was regarded as indispensable. In the advanced market 
economies, the private sector functions as a main absorber of a huge amount of financial 
resources from pension funds. In Russia, while similar organizations were already in 
existence, they were still weak, and financial markets were underdeveloped.   
 
2-3 Scheme of the new pension system
4 
In December 2001, a “package” of three federal laws was adopted. These “troika 
pension laws” were expected to work as the core or base of the new Russian pension system.
5 
In addition, Federal Law No. 198 of December 31, 2001 established tax deductions from unified 
social taxes as contributions to the mandatory pension insurance.
6 
Let us look at the characteristic feature of the new legislation. In the adopted laws, 
the new pension system consists of three parts: basic part (basic pension), insured part 
(earning-related pension) and funded part (fully funded pension) (see Table 4). The basic 
pension is fixed, and its size is determined by the law. Contributions for the basic part are 
paid directly to the federal budget. The size of the payment from the insured part depends on 
the size of contributions of the insurer into the PFR, indexation by inflation, revenues of the 
PFR and so on. The amount of money for the payment of the insured part is accumulated in 
the PFR. The funded part is formed in individual accounts and indexed according to the 
                                                      
4 The outline of the new pension system of Russia was given in Afanasiev (2003), Ivanov and 
Stroutchenevsky (2003), OECD (2004, pp. 113-120), Ohtsu (2003), Shinoda (2003) and World 
Bank (2002).   
5 Federal Law No. 166 “On Provision of State Pensions in the Russian Federation” dated 
December 15, 2001 regulated social pensions financed by budget transfers to those who failed 
to earn the entitlement to a labor pension, pensions to victims of nuclear and man-made 
disasters, military conscripts and public servants. The second was Federal Law No. 167 “On 
Mandatory Pension Insurance in the Russian Federation” dated December 15, 2001 which 
defined the rights and obligations of insurants, insured individuals and insurers, procedure of 
contributions to the mandatory pension insurance and their rates depending on the insured 
individual’s age and occupation. The third was Federal Law No. 173 “On Labor Pensions in the 
Russian Federation” dated December 17, 2001 which regulated the terms and standards of 
entitlement to labor pensions. As it became effective, the previous law “On State Pensions in the 
Russian Federation”, No. 340 of November 20, 1990, lost validity. 
6 Federal Law No. 198 “On Amending the Tax Code of the Russian Federation and Certain 
Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation on Taxes and Duties.”  
  6
returns from the savings in the PFR. The size of the payment from the funded part depends 
only on the contributions by the insurer and the rate of returns of the PFR. Only the funded 
part can be transferred from the PFR to non-state pension funds. 
Based on this new legislation, all monetary resources in the PFR seemed to be 
consolidated. Because the exact procedure for saving the funded part of pension was not 
specified in the law, the possibility seemed to exist that the income from investments might 
go indexed to the insured part of the pension, but the funded part might not be protected 
from high inflation. This kind of contradiction could be removed by the adoption of the law 
of investment of the funded part of pension. 
The size of the payments which go to the insured and funded parts depends on 
various factors. For those people who were born after 1966 and earn less 100,000 rubles a 
year, the following relations are applied: starting from 2006, eight percent of wages go to 
the insured part, and six percent go to the funded part (see Table 4). Because unified social 
tax is a regressive tax, an amount of payments to these two parts depends on annual wages 
of the insured. It is possible to participate in the funded part of the pension system for men 
who were born in 1953 or more recently and for women who were born in 1957 or more 
recently (cohorts B and C in Table 4). People born in 1967 or more recently (cohort C in 
Table 4) are fully eligible to participate in the funded system. Transfers of the funded part 
from the PFR to non-state pension funds were to be permitted after the beginning of 2004.   
 
3. Legislation and implementation process of the pension reform of 2002 
3-1 Continued legislation 
The year 2002 was the start for the new pension system. Our focus is on what 
happened in the implementation process in 2002-2003 and on what kinds of problems or tasks 
remained that were stipulated in the new “Reform program.” At the end of 2001, three important 
laws were not adopted. The first one was “Law on Investments of the Funded Part of Labor 
Pension,” the second was “Law on Amendments to Law on Non-state Pension Funds” and the 
third was “Mandatory Occupational Pension Law.” Legislative works continued, and the first 
two laws were passed in 2002. The third one, however, has not been completed as of the end of 
2004. 
 
3-1-1 Investment of the funded part   
The first to be mentioned is the Federal law No. 111 of July 24, 2002, “On 
Investments of Resources for Financing of the Funded Part of Labor Pension in the Russian 
Federation.” This law established the legal framework of relations for accumulation and 
investment of pension assets for financing the funded part of labor pensions; defined details of  
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the legal status, rights, liabilities and responsibilities of legal agents and participants in relations 
for accumulation and investment of pension assets; and established the principles of public 
control and supervision in this area. 
This law was one which was vital for the functioning of the basic law on labor 
pension. Based on this law, the funded part of the mandatory pension was to be transferred to 




3-1-2 Non-state pension funds 
While non-state pension funds have been quite eager to obtain opportunities to serve 
as managers of pension money, there was no legislation to allow this to happen. Although there 
were some 300 such funds in Russia, the new pension reform program did not include them in 
the initial stage. Hence, Federal Law No. 14 of January 10, 2003 on Making Amendments and 
Additions to Federal Law “on Non-state Pension Funds” was issued.
8  
One of the major points in these amendments and additions was a way to include the 
non-state pension funds in the market-oriented operation of the new working pension law with 
the introduction of the funded part. In the old law, there was no possibility for them to 
participate in the business. This federal law regulates legal, economic and social relations 
arising in the course of the establishment of non-state pension funds, and it regulates their 
operations in respect to provision of non-state pensions, mandatory pension insurance and 
occupational pension insurance and in liquidating non-state pension funds. It essentially 
establishes the main principles of state control over their operations.   
Operations of the non-state pension fund as an insurant under the mandatory pension 
insurance includes accumulation and investment of pension savings, record keeping of pension 
savings of the insured persons, and assignment and payment of the funded part of the labor 
pension to the insured persons.   
 
3-1-3 Occupational pensions 
The third large and ailing barrier to the completion of pension reforms in the sphere of 
legislation is the unadopted law of the mandatory occupational pension. The new occupational 
pension system was conceived mainly by market liberalists in order to remove the heavy burden 
of the PAYG system on the state budget. For those workers in hazardous and strenuous jobs in 
various industries and places, special provisions had been set, allowing earlier retirement (five 
                                                      
7 The Russian government issued a “provisional code” in March 2002 which ordered the PFR 
to manage the funded part of the labor pension and to keep its value by purchasing the state 
bonds. 
8  The old law was adopted on May 7, 1998 as Federal Law No. 75.  
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years or ten years), which were all financed by the state pension system. This was another 
typical example of the “socialist disease” of the Russian pension system. At the end of the 1990s, 
one out of seven pensioners was one of those “privileged” persons. The new occupational 
pension law was expected to envisage the new source for financing. Thus, the employers are 
obliged to pay, in addition to the normal rate, another six percent of wages (or 16 percent for 
those employers in especially hazardous and too strenuous situations). According to a rough 
estimate, it would be two percent of wage funds, and its total would amount to 50 billion rubles 
in 2003. If employers want to economize the payment, they are to make more efforts to improve 
the work conditions or raise the technical and safety level of their work places. This was what 
the proposer of the new law and the Government expected. There was, however, a strong 
opposition from the employers’ side.   
It took a long time to finalize the government draft law before it was made public in 
November 2001. Heated debates at the State Duma lasted more than a year, and it was only in 
December 2002 when the draft law passed the first reading.
9 
Right after New Year’s Day in 2003, “a big trouble for the new pension system” 
existed, because the payment of pensions to those entitled was stopped and a new law which 
would guarantee the payment was not implemented. Mass media reported this incidence with a 
headline of “Especially Hazardous Occupational Pension” (Izvestiia, January 14, 2003). 
Even in 2004 no progress was observed in this area of pension reform. Such a big 
delay in legislative movements seems to be deeply connected with the behaviors of non-state 
pension funds and employers as well, and with ideological and political struggles behind the 
scene. Why are the concerns so serious and deep over the matter of non-state pension funds or 
occupational pensions? This shows, in the authors’ view, the typically Russian characteristics of 
pension reform process. 
 
3-2 Obstacles in implementation in 2003   
Apart from the legislative process, there were administrative or organizational 
problems which hindered the normal progress of implementation or institutionalization of the 
new pension system in Russia. In his Annual Address on May 16, 2003, President Putin proudly 
announced to the Parliament that the first steps were made to reform the pension system. The 
average pension, which three years earlier was not more than 70 percent of the pensioner’s 
subsistence minimum, almost reached it in 2002 (see Table 2). But not long after his address, the 
problem of “letter of happiness” and of selecting asset management companies cast a dark 
                                                      
9 It is interesting to note that in the last chapter of the draft law, it was written that this law 
would be effective from July 1, 2002, except some articles which would be effective from 
January 1, 2003.  
  9
shadow on his message.   
 
3-2-1 Letter of happiness 
According to Government Decree No. 346 of June 19, 2003 issued in accordance with 
the law on investment of the funded pension, the PFR was to send notices to individuals on the 
balance of funded pension accounts until August 1, 2003, and each receiver was to select one of 
the asset managers until October 15, 2003. This was considered to be an ordinary organizational 
work and to be carried out easily by the bureaucrats and employees at the PFR which employed 
more than 100,000 people including central and regional organs throughout the country. But this 
assumption proved to be wrong. In the summer of 2003, it became known that there were 
thousands of cases where eligible people did not receive the notice. This notice was commonly 
called as a “letter of happiness,” because it carried information about how much the insured had 
accumulated in his/her personal account at the PFR balance. While top people in charge were 
called to the Duma, it remained unclear with whom the responsibility lay, either the PFR or the 
post office, both of whom blamed each other. 
On September 2, Prime Minister Kas’ianov held a meeting with his deputies and key 
ministers on the letter of happiness issue. It was decided that the Russian Government would 
discuss the progress of the pension reform only after the Cabinet of Ministers approved a set of 
measures to accelerate mailing of these notices. The Government was obliged to make 
amendments to Article 41 of the law on investments for financing the funded part.
10 By 
Government Decree No. 606 of October 1, 2003, a new deadline for mailing notices to 
individuals was to be November 1, 2003, and a deadline for selecting the asset manager was to 
be December 31, 2003. 
 
3-2-2 Selection of the pension asset manager 
One of the serious problems which hindered the realization of the new pension system 
was the selection of pension asset management companies. Those insurants who luckily 
received the “letter of happiness” were supposed to inform to the PFR which asset management 
company they would choose out of 55 companies, licensed by the Ministry of Finance,
11 
because they were now the owner of pension assets and could invest them to increase the sum. 
This was exactly the core of the new funded pension scheme. 
                                                      
10 Federal Law No. 135 of November 10, 2003, “On Making Amendments to Article 41 of 
Federal Law “On Investments of Resources for Financing of the Funded Part of Labor Pensions 
in the Russian Federation.” 
11 The Ministry of Finance published the results of the tender to select asset managers for 
investment of pension savings on September 5, 2003. Fifty-five companies out of 59 applicants 
were declared the best bidders of the tender.  
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Insurants were expected to inform the PFR about their selection by the end of the year. 
At the end of November, however, according to the report by an advisor of the head of the PFR, 
Vladimir Viiunitskii, the total number of replies was 45,000. This was only 0.1 percent of those 
eligible to receive the letter of happiness (Novie Izvestiia, December 1, 2003). Another report 
stated that by the end of December, the number had risen to 700,000, but the ratio to those 
eligible still remained at two percent. Why was the number of respondents so small? These 
reports indicated not the inefficiency of the PFR, but the extremely low level of interests on the 
side of insurants or total lack of necessary information about asset management companies.   
We might draw a tentative conclusion that in Russia people at large do not still know 
what the pension assets or its management mean and/or do not trust those financial institutions 
or investment companies at all. Or, they might think that these things do not have any 
relationship to them. This is a very inconvenient situation for those concerned with setting up 
the new pension scheme which presupposed quite a contrary picture.   
According to a report of an opinion poll center, VTsIOM, three out of four people in 
Russia do not understand the pension reform (Summary of 2003, December 2, 2003). One day 
earlier, Viiunitskii officially had admitted that the first stage of pension reforms in Russia was a 
failure (Novie Izvestiia, December 1, 2003).   
 
3.3 Troubles with social reforms and political backlash in 2004 
3.3.1 Fate of Dmitriev, Zurabov, and Kas’ianov 
In the spring of 2004, a big change took place among leading figures in the pension 
reform front; and the fates of Dmitriev, Zurabov, and Kas’ianov differed greatly. Prime Minister, 
Mikhail Kas’ianov was fired in March 2004, and his cabinet was reshuffled accordingly. On the 
pension reform stage, Mikhail Dmitriev stepped down. Dmitriev had been one of the strongest 
protagonists of the funded pension scheme and a vigorous opponent to Mikhail Zurabov, the 
head of the PFR, who was appointed as the Minister for Health Care and Social Development. 
Here we observe a result of a two-year struggle among these three leaders. The apparent winner 
was Mikhail Zurabov, and the loser was Mikhail Dmitriev. Both are liberals from Saint 
Petersburg whose careers began as specialists in mathematics and economic cybernetics. But, 
the position of winners and losers on the political stage changes quickly as observed everywhere 
in the world, and within a year this proves to be the case in Russia as well.   
 
3-3-2 Amendments in pension reform legislations 
The situation of Putin’s pension reform train was like a train which passed through a 
rough and wild field. And another heavier freight was loaded and the train was driven on to 
another track. That was the change of direction of whole social security system, not just the  
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pension system. Various policies, all connected with pension reforms (or more exactly, with the 
failure of reforms), were put forward suddenly or in an abrupt and unplanned way. The most 
serious and controversial policy options were as follows: 
1) Middle age cohorts (those born before 1967; cohorts A and B in Table 4) were 
excluded from the mandatory funded pension scheme. This was proposed as an amendment of 
the pension law in April, 2004. These two cohorts were given a chance to take a voluntary 
accumulation scheme with an additional payment of four percent of wages to this scheme. 
Parliamentarians were strongly opposed to this amendment on the ground that it would make it 
more difficult for the population to understand the new pension system and that it would 
eventually disinterest them (www.rosbalt.ru, June 8, 2004) 
2) The proposal to reduce the unified social tax rate by about eight percent (from 28 
percent to 20 percent) from the beginning of 2005 caused great concern over the possible 
decrease in revenues of the PFR. This will negatively affect pension reform as a whole. 
3) In the spring of 2004, almost at the same time as the reform of Government 
administrative structure, a new wave of social reforms backed by the President arrived. A bill 
was proposed to replace the nation’s pervasive social benefits system with monetary 
compensations, so-called monetization of welfare benefits. 
Starting in January 2005, when the bill takes effect, some benefits groups are to get 
monetary compensation instead of subsidized discounts on transportation, medicine, and other 
necessities. The bill repealed 41 laws and amended 155 others to end benefits introduced in the 
Soviet era to millions of retirees, military veterans, the disabled and Chernobyl cleanup workers, 
among others (www.pensionline.ru, August 3, 2004).  
The bill was approved by the Duma in the first reading on July 2, 2004. The new 
policy triggered anger from socially handicapped and masses of pensioners. The bill was pushed 
through Parliament so quickly that even some deputies did not know its exact content. 
Meanwhile, hundreds of protesters opposing the bill clashed with police outside the Duma 
building. Members of the radical National Bolshevik Party attempted to barricade themselves in 
the Health Care and Social Development Ministry building where Mikhail Zurabov presided. 
 
3-3-3 “Babushka revolution” 
This wave of mass protest continued through the rest of the year, culminating in mass 
demonstrations with violent street actions like blockading the traffic in January and February of 
2005. In many cases, riot police were brought in, and the battlefield spread to almost all of 
Russia. This “revolution” forced the Government to make concessions, either by raising the 
basic pensions (see footnote 13) or by softening the reform package for monetization. But, what 
is important is the mass demand to dismiss the liberalist reformers and eventually the  
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resignation of Putin himself.   
The Putin regime has never met with such a strong mass opposition and could not 
avoid the no-confidence vote for Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov in the State Duma in February, 
although he survived. Mikhail Zurabov, a winner in the pension reform drama until the 
beginning of 2004, became the most unpopular politician in the beginning of 2005.   
All this suggests that the social reform policy package put forward by Putin and his 
men in 2004 substantially weakened his power base and made social reforms further more 
difficult politically. It is obvious that Putin’s pension reform train went widely off track since its 
inception in 2001. 
 
4 Statistical analyses on pension reforms in Russia 
As Table 2 shows, since 2000, the average pension has significantly increased in real 
terms and in terms of conversion to U.S. dollars.
12 The ratio of average pension to subsistence 
minimum has risen as well, as pointed out by Putin. Although the average replacement rate has 
been low since 1999, we have to take into account considerable increases in wages in recent 
years. It is difficult to say whether there was a significant improvement after the pension reform 
in 2002. Since 2003, real growth of pension has been around five percent, and the average 
replacement rate has been under 30 percent.
13 In this section we attempt statistical analyses on 
pension reforms in Russia from demographic and financial perspectives. 
 
4.1 Demographic perspective 
As is known, due to the age structure of the Russian population, the demographic 
burden on the pension system in Russia will be light in several years to come. But, after that 
period, the situation will deteriorate much faster even compared with the developed countries 
where demographic burden on the pension system is already very heavy. This is illustrated in 
Table 5 which shows the dependency ratio of Russia. In this table, figures until 2003 are actual 
ones derived from official statistics, and those after 2004 are based on the population forecast 
and on some assumptions.
14 Both dependency ratio (C) and system dependency ratio (D) 
decreased in the period 1999-2003. Even after 2004 these ratios will not exceed their high levels 
                                                      
12  This was partly due to the appreciation of rubles against dollars. 
13 Prime Minister Fradkov announced in the Parliament on February 10, 2005 that the 
Government intended to double the amount of pensions (as well as wages) within four years. 
Apparently, this means about 19 percent growth per year in nominal terms. As Table 2 shows, 
this target does not seem unfeasible, if we take into account forecasted annual inflation rates 
around ten percent in coming years.   
14  We expect that this population forecast (A and B of the table) published by the Goskomstat in 
2002 will be modified soon, based on the result of the population census in 2002.    
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of the mid-1990s until 2010.
15  
The situation will drastically change around the year 2010. Both dependency ratios 
will reach an unprecedented level, and there are no factors that will improve this situation after 
2015. Sooner or later, it will be necessary to increase the retirement age.   
Table 6 shows the PAYG equation in Russia. Although a three-pillar pension system 
was introduced in Russia in 2002, no payment will be made from the funded part of their 
contribution until 2021 for women and until 2026 for men. Therefore, we might assume that 
until that time the Russian pension system will work as the PAYG system as before.   
The PAYG equation is:   
αN=βM(1-τ). 
Where N and M are the number of people employed and of pensioners, respectively.
16 
α is average pension contribution rate, β is average replacement rate, and τ is ratio of budgetary 
transfers to pension expenditures. 
As is the case in Table 5, figures until 2003 in Table 6 are actual figures, and those 
after 2004 are based on the forecast and some assumptions. As we discussed, tariff of unified 
social taxes was reduced from 28 percent to 20 percent in the beginning of 2005. Hence, we 
assume that pension contribution rate will be lower in 2005 accordingly. As a result, although 
system dependency ratio will not be so high in the period until 2010, if we maintain replacement 
rate at the level of 30 percent, budgetary transfers should be increased significantly. This table 
shows that transfers from the federal budget should be at least 35 percent of the revenue of the 
PFR. 
In addition, we have to take into consideration that a part of contributions will be 
designated for the funded part. In the PFR budget laws for 2004 and 2005, contribution for the 
funded part accounts for 7.7 percent and 6.9 percent of total revenue of the PFR, respectively 
(Table 8). Therefore, budgetary transfers should be larger than 42-43 percent in the period until 
2010.  
Already in the forecast made by the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade 
(Minekonomrazvitiia, 2001, pp. 5-6), additional financing from the federal budget in 2005-2010 
was taken for granted. Evidently, Russian planners of pension reforms did not assume from the 
beginning that the new pension scheme would work self-sufficiently. Changes in the pension 
scheme made in the beginning of 2005 considerably strengthened the dependence of the PFR on 
                                                      
15 We should note that in Table 5 numbers of N and M in the period after 2004 depend on the 
assumed constant value of E and F and that the trend in the 1990s clearly shows that E=N/A is 
decreasing and that F=M/B is increasing. Hence, system dependency ratio (M/N) could be 
higher in the period 2003-2010. 
16 We include not only old-age pensioners, but also all other categories of pensioners when 
counting M for the sake of simplicity. As Table 3 shows, old-age pensioners account for less 
than 80 percent of total pensioners.  
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the federal budget.   
 
4.2 Financial perspective 
Table 7 shows the burden of the PFR for the Russian economy. Ratios of both revenue 
and expenditure of the PFR reached their lowest in 1999-2001. In 2002 and 2003, these ratios 
largely increased.
17  This trend is also observed in ratios of revenue and expenditure of the state 
budget, but expenditure of the state budget was not so large in 2002 and 2003 compared with 
the mid-1990s. If we take into consideration these trends and a recent economic boom, it is safe 
to say that the burden of the PFR is not so heavy, at least in the period until 2005.   
Let us look at the detail of the balance of the PFR (Table 8).
18  It should be noted that 
after 2002 we have to distinguish the current budget of the PFR and financial resources for the 
payment of the funded part of the PFR. Contributions for the funded part has not been used, but 
accumulated as financial resources for the payment of the funded part in the future (Table 9). 
Because Table 8, official statistics of the PFR, represents a consolidated budget, including 
current budget and investment budget for the payment of the funded part, special attention 
should be paid to the following two points. On the one hand, expenditures of the PFR 
earmarked for the payment of the funded part must be deducted from the expenditure of Table 8. 
Because with regard to actual figures for 2002 and planned figures for 2003 proper treatment 
was not given in the official statistics and in the budget law, we recalculate the figures for 2002 
and 2003 (planned) in Table 8.
19 
On the other hand, the balance as of the beginning (or end) of year (A or D) must be 
divided into two parts: the balance of the current budget (A1 or D1) and the balance of the 
investment fund (A2 or D2), as was done in Table 8. In other words, as a matter of course, the 
consolidated balance of the PFR (A or D) increases year by year due to the savings of the 
contribution for the funded part. Needless to say, this does not show soundness of the budget of 
                                                      
17  As for the PFR expenditure in 2002, we do not use the figure published in RSE (789.6 billion 
rubles), because as the PFR execution law for 2002 shows, this figure includes idle funds (71.0 
billion rubles) and the financial resources reserved for the funded part (34.5 billion rubles). We 
exclude them in Table 7 and Table 8, as we discuss below. If we use the RSE figure, the PFR 
expenditure amounts to 7.3 percent of GDP, and the balance turns negative (0.8 percent of 
GDP).  
18  Because detailed data for 2003 and preliminary data for 2004 are not available, in Table 8 we 
use planned figures for 2003 and 2004, as well as those for 2005.   
19 As for 2002, see footnote 17. Similarly, for planned figure for 2003, from total expenditure 
(864.9 billion rubles), we exclude the expenditure for investment (52.2 billion rubles) and net 
financial result transferred to asset management companies (3.5 billion rubles). In spite of these 
recalculations, there are inconsistencies in the figures shown in Table 8. By definition, 
A+B=C+D in this table. However, after 2002 this equation holds true only for 2005. For 2002, 
2003 (planned) and 2004, there are discrepancies amounting to 13.7 billion rubles, 10.9 billion 
rubles and 23.8 billion rubles, respectively.    
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the PFR. We have to analyze the two balances separately.
20  
As for the balance of the current budget (A1 or D1), it decreased every year from 
2001 due to deficits of the current budget (E1). It should be emphasized that in official statistics 
such as RSE, these deficits of the PFR were not explicitly shown due to the consolidation with 
the balance of accumulated funds (E2). It was the huge surplus recorded in 2000 (90.2 billion 
rubles) that has financed the deficits in the following years. In 2000, the PFR expenditure 
amounted to only 4.7 percent of GDP, the record lowest since 1992 (see Table 7). Accumulated 
surpluses decreased year by year, and the balance of the current budget will reach only 14.3 
billion rubles by the end of 2005. In this year, according to the PFR budget law, the deficit of 
the current budget will amount to 82.9 billion rubles, almost the same amount of the increase in 
financial resources for the funded part (84.1 billion rubles).
21 
We regard that this is the main reason why Article 3 of federal budget law for 2005 
specified that if the Stabilization Fund of the federal budget exceeds 500 billion rubles, these 
rubles would be used for the financing of deficits of the PFR and for the redemption of state 
debts.
22 Without receiving these funds from the federal budget, the PFR might go into 
bankruptcy within a year or so, as Table 8 demonstrates.
23 
Let us turn to the investment fund of the PFR (Table 9). Because every year a portion 
of revenues of unified social taxes is transferred to this balance and expenditures are limited, we 
observe a stable increase in this balance.
24  Investment incomes amount to about eight percent of 
total revenue in 2004 and 2005. Investment yields (F1 or F2) have been decreasing, and they are 
to be three to four percent in 2005.
25  Government Decree No. 652 of August 31, 2002 specified 
                                                      
20 While in a table of RSE (2004, p. 570), balance as of January 1, 2003 amounts to 33,634 
million rubles, this was completely an irreconcilable value. It was probably related to the 
mistreatment of figures in 2002, mentioned above. We do not use this value in Table 8.   
21 Compared with 2005, the PFR expenditure in 2004 was planned to be much smaller, as 
shown in Table 7. 
22 As of January 1, 2005, the Stabilization Fund amounted to 522.3 billion rubles and received 
another 218.4 billion rubles of idle funds from the federal budget in January and spent 93.5 
billion rubles for the redemption of state debts on January 31. As a result, the Stabilization Fund 
reached 647.2 billion rubles as of February 1, 2005 (Rossiiskaia gazeta, February 11, 2005, p. 5). 
As specified in Federal Law No. 184 of December 23, 2004, when the oil price is over 20 
dollars per barrel, excess tax revenues of export duties on oil and severance taxes (mineral 
extraction taxes) on oil, calculated as the difference between tax revenues levied when oil price 
is 20 dollars per barrel and actual revenues, are included in the Stabilization Fund.   
23  We should point out another discrepancy in Table 8. Although A1 should coincide with D1 of 
the preceding year, every year from 2003 A1 is larger than D1 of the preceding year. The 
discrepancy reaches almost 30 billion rubles in 2004 and 50 billion rubles in 2005.   
24  From 2004 transfers to non-state pension funds were launched, as specified in the scheme of 
the pension reform of 2002. The first transfer (1,611 million rubles) was made in March, 2004 
(Rossiiskaia biznes-gazeta, March 30, 2004, pp. 1, 4).   
25 As of March 12, 2004, the net financial result by the investments of contributions for the 
funded part received in 2002 (33,684 million rubles) amounted to 13,489 million rubles, 40.0 
percent of those contributions, according to the official report of the PFR (Rossiiskaia gazeta,  
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that contributions for the funded part could be invested only in state bonds in rubles, and those 
in foreign currencies and mortgage securities under state guarantee transacted in an organized 
securities market. Actually, all of the financial resources for the funded part were invested in 
various kinds of state bonds.
26 The Government issued a new type of state bond, called “state 
savings bonds (gosudarstvennye sberegatel’nye obligatsii, GSO), which are to be purchased 
exclusively by the PFR and other non-state pension funds.
27 The reason why such state bonds 
were ordered to be issued in spite of the surplus of the federal budget in these years is explained 
by the present situation of Russian financial markets, where no other reliable objects of 
investments of the pension funds are available.
28 
As was explained above, the actual payment from the funded part will begin in 2022 
for women and in 2027 for men. A rough calculation (assuming annual investment yield of four 
percent) suggests that financial resources for the payment of the funded part will exceed the 
annual revenue of the PFR by 2011 and will become 3.5 times larger than the annual revenue of 
the PFR in 2022.
29  This will be more than 20 percent of the GDP, a huge amount of money that 
should be invested more productively.   
 
5 Concluding remarks 
Although it is difficult to evaluate ongoing reforms, it is safe to draw the following 
two conclusions. First, we could say that the concept of the pension reform of 2002 has several 
deficiencies. Among others, the introduction of a three-pillar system was premature, if we take 
into account underdevelopment of financial markets in Russia and the difficulty of paying 
pensions, caused by the savings of some part of the contribution for the payment of the funded 
part. On the other hand, there were no improvements in the PAYG or non-funded part of the 
pension. The retirement age was not increased. All of the contributions were to be paid by 
employers; workers were expected to pay nothing, as before. The contribution rate was not 
                                                                                                                                                            
March 31, 2004, p. 9). This report was published in accordance with Government Decree No. 73 
of February 12, 2004. 
26 It was reported that 65 percent of resources were invested in state bonds in rubles and 35 
percent in foreign currencies, mostly in Eurobonds (Rossiiskaia biznes-gazeta, February 25, 
2004, p. 2).   
27 These new bonds were issued in 2004 in the amount of 30 billion rubles by Government 
Order No. 122 of January 23, 2004 and in the amount of 60 billion rubles in 2005 (Rossiiskaia 
biznes-gazeta, February 3, 2004, pp. 1-2; January 18, 2005, pp. 1, 5). They were reported to be 
profitable for investors who wanted to invest money over a long term (Ekonomika i zhizn’, 2005, 
No. 3, p. 4).   
28 In Federal Law No. 111 of July 24, 2002, which determined the scheme of investments for 
the funded part, nine objects of investments were listed, including bonds of regional 
governments, stocks and so on. 
29 This simulation was based on rough estimates of the age structure of labor, i.e., about 40 
percent of total labor belong to cohort A & B and about 60 percent to cohort C in the definition 
of Table 4. Contribution rates shown in Table 4 were also taken into account.    
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increased, but decreased in 2005. The Putin administration seems to have heavily leaned on the 
personal popularity of Putin himself, an economic boom sustained by a high oil price, and a 
temporal easement of demographic burden in the 2000s.   
  Second, it should be regarded as a natural result of these deficiencies, significant 
modifications in pension laws were introduced already in 2005. Roughly, one fourth of workers 
were excluded from the funded scheme. The payment from the funded part will start not in 2011, 
as was originally specified, but in 2022. In addition, a decision on the reduction in unified social 
tax rates will inevitably aggravate the financial situation surrounding the PFR. Now we hesitate 
to say that in Russia a three-pillar pension system was introduced.   
  Then, what do we expect in the Russian pension system in the future? The situation 
surrounding the budget of the PFR will not be good. It will be sustained by the federal budget or 
by oil money, at least, in the near future. The replacement rate will not increase above 30 
percent. A great number of benefits and privileges which covered the low level of the 
replacement rate in the past were abolished in the beginning of this year. The prospect is not 
bright. It seems that other reforms that are feasible and sustainable in the long run are inevitable. 
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1956 State pension law of the USSR
1990 June The Pension Fund of Russia (PFR) was set up.
November State pension law of the Russian Federation
1995 Concepts of the Pension System Reform in the Russian Federation
1998 Pension Reform Program
1998 May Law on non-state pension funds
2000 March Russian association of non-state pension funds
2001 January Introduction of unified social tax
May The first National Council for pension system reform was convened.
December "Troika laws" on the new pension system in Russia 
2002 July Law on Investments of the Funded Part of Labor Pension
2004 March Restructuring of administrative structure 
2005 January Amendments of laws on pension laws, monetization policy 
"Babushka revolution" threats Putin's administration.  
Table 2. Average Pension in Russia
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
A Average monthly pension in new
rubles 0.1 0.2 1.6 19.9 78.5 188.1 302.2 328.1 399.0 449.0 694.3 1,023.5 1,378.5 1,637.0 1,915.0
B in dollars, converted at official
rate 174.5 318.6 8.3 20.1 35.8 41.3 59.0 56.7 41.1 18.2 24.7 35.1 44.0 53.3 66.5
C in dollars, converted at PPP ŋŋŋ ŋŋŋ 67.5 86.1 85.1 125.7 136.8 129.5 141.0 83.0 95.0 122.1 145.1 ŋŋŋ ŋŋŋ
D Ratio of average pension to
subsistence minimum (%) 237.0 170.0 119.3 138.1 128.6 101.0 116.0 113.2 114.7 70.2 76.4 89.5 100.0 102.0 ŋŋŋ
E Average replacement rate (%) ŋŋŋ ŋŋŋ 26.0 33.9 35.6 39.8 38.2 34.0 37.9 29.5 31.2 31.6 31.6 29.8 28.0
F Nominal increase of average
pension (%) ŋŋŋ 181.4 864.9 1,243.8 394.5 239.6 160.7 108.6 121.6 112.5 154.6 147.4 134.7 118.8 117.0
G Real increase of average pension
(%) 113.0 97.0 51.9 130.7 96.8 80.5 108.7 94.6 95.2 60.6 128.0 121.4 116.3 104.5 105.5
H 1991=100 ŋŋŋ 100.0 51.9 67.8 65.7 52.9 57.5 54.4 51.7 31.4 40.1 48.7 56.7 59.2 62.5
Sources:
A: Includes compensation. For 1990-1991: Sotsial'noe, 1997, p. 9; 1992-2000: RSE, 2001, p. 197; 1992, 1995-2003: RSE, 2004, p. 187; 2004: SEP, 2004, No. 12.
D: For 1990-1991: Sotsial'naia, 1996, p. 6; 1992-2000: RSE, 2001, p. 197; 1992, 1995-2003: RSE, 2004, p. 187.
E: For 1992-2000: RSE, 2001, p. 197; 1992, 1995-2003: RSE, 2004, p. 187: SEP, 2004, No. 12.
F: Calculated from A.
G: For 1990-1991: Sotsial'noe, 1997, p. 9; 1992-2000: RSE, 2001, p. 197; 1992, 1995-2003: RSE, 2004, p. 187: SEP, 2004, No. 12.
H: Calculated from G.
C: Calculated from A and Purchasing Power Parity (For 1992: Natsional'nye, 1995, p. 50; 1993-1994: Natsional'nye, 1998, p. 111; 1995-1997: Natsional'nye, 2001, p. 180; 1998: RSE, 2001, p. 637;
1999-2002: RSE, 2004 p. 690).
B: Calculated from A and official exchange rates (For 1990-1992: WB, 1995, p. 433; 1993-2001: IFS, 2002, pp. 858-859; 2002-2003: IFS, July 2004, p. 832; 2004: simple calculations from monthly
averages in SEP, 2004, No. 12).
Table 3. Number of Pensioners and Average Pension by Pension Category in Russia 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Number of registered pensioners
at the end of year (in thousands)
Total 32,848 34,044 35,273 36,100 36,623 37,083 37,827 38,184 38,410 38,381 38,411 38,630 38,432 38,164
Old-age pension 25,659 27,131 28,390 29,021 29,095 29,011 29,081 28,993 29,023 28,932 28,813 28,989 29,705 29,272
Disability pension 3,514 3,385 3,363 3,562 3,910 4,270 4,542 4,813 4,816 4,816 4,822 4,848 4,551 4,487
Survivors' pension 2,792 2,574 2,473 2,420 2,423 2,482 2,464 2,532 2,601 2,622 2,116 2,640 2,547 2,749
Pension for long service 82 84 91 107 135 197 544 577 631 657 674 674 ŋŋŋ ŋŋŋ
Social pension 470 870 956 990 1,060 1,123 1,196 1,269 1,339 1,354 1,986 1,479 1,613 1,636
Old-age (or disability) pension
and pension for long service to
civil servants ŋŋŋ ŋŋŋ ŋŋŋ ŋŋŋ ŋŋŋ ŋŋŋ ŋŋŋ ŋŋŋ ŋŋŋ ŋŋŋ ŋŋŋ ŋŋŋ 16 20
(in percent of total)
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Old-age pension 78.1 79.7 80.5 80.4 79.4 78.2 76.9 75.9 75.6 75.4 75.0 75.0 77.3 76.7
Disability pension 10.7 9.9 9.5 9.9 10.7 11.5 12.0 12.6 12.5 12.5 12.6 12.5 11.8 11.8
Survivors' pension 8.5 7.6 7.0 6.7 6.6 6.7 6.5 6.6 6.8 6.8 5.5 6.8 6.6 7.2
Pension for long service 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.5 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.7 ŋŋŋ ŋŋŋ
Social pension 1.4 2.6 2.7 2.7 2.9 3.0 3.2 3.3 3.5 3.5 5.2 3.8 4.2 4.3
Old-age (or disability) pension
and pension for long service to
civil servants ŋŋŋ ŋŋŋ ŋŋŋ ŋŋŋ ŋŋŋ ŋŋŋ ŋŋŋ ŋŋŋ ŋŋŋ ŋŋŋ ŋŋŋ ŋŋŋ 0.0 0.1
Amount of monthly pension in
new rubles, including
Average 0.113 0.419 3.5 43.1 120.1 242.6 320.1 366.4 402.9 521.5 823.4 1,138.0 1,462.3 1,747.4
Old-age pension 0.121 0.438 3.7 45.4 128.3 258.5 333.5 385.1 430.7 549.2 894.0 1,246.3 1,589.0 1,906.0
Disability pension 0.101 0.405 3.2 37.3 104.5 218.0 299.6 333.7 352.3 466.9 698.5 940.4 1,157.1 1,363.4
Survivors' pension 0.064 0.280 2.2 27.8 64.0 132.8 241.0 256.5 257.1 389.7 501.5 668.9 792.7 1,010.1
Pension for long service 0.118 0.335 4.5 53.0 143.1 277.0 337.0 388.0 390.4 488.0 673.7 846.5 ŋŋŋ ŋŋŋ
Social pension 0.068 0.314 2.1 32.2 77.4 160.1 245.7 271.6 271.6 395.3 496.7 631.7 1,032.0 1,179.8
Old-age (or disability) pension
and pension for long service to
civil servants ŋŋŋ ŋŋŋ ŋŋŋ ŋŋŋ ŋŋŋ ŋŋŋ ŋŋŋ ŋŋŋ ŋŋŋ ŋŋŋ ŋŋŋ ŋŋŋ 3,036.3 3,368.5
(in percent of the average)
Average 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Old-age pension 107.1 104.5 105.7 105.3 106.8 106.6 104.2 105.1 106.9 105.3 108.6 109.5 108.7 109.1
Disability pension 89.4 96.7 91.4 86.5 87.0 89.9 93.6 91.1 87.4 89.5 84.8 82.6 79.1 78.0
Survivors' pension 56.6 66.8 62.9 64.5 53.3 54.7 75.3 70.0 63.8 74.7 60.9 58.8 54.2 57.8
Pension for long service 104.4 80.0 128.6 123.0 119.2 114.2 105.3 105.9 96.9 93.6 81.8 74.4 ŋŋŋ ŋŋŋ
Social pension 60.2 74.9 60.0 74.7 64.4 66.0 76.8 74.1 67.4 75.8 60.3 55.5 70.6 67.5
Old-age (or disability) pension
and pension for long service to
civil servants ŋŋŋ ŋŋŋ ŋŋŋ ŋŋŋ ŋŋŋ ŋŋŋ ŋŋŋ ŋŋŋ ŋŋŋ ŋŋŋ ŋŋŋ ŋŋŋ 207.6 192.8
Source:
  For 1990-2000: RSE, 2001, p. 197; 1990, 1995-2003: RSE, 2004, p. 188.
Table 4. The New Pension System of Russia 








A0 % 0 %
B2 % 2 %
C 3-5% 6%
Pillar 3 funded voluntary non-state pension funds investment yield - - -




basic part fixed amount A, B, C 6% 6%
A & B 14% 14%
C 10% 8%
A & B 0% 0%
C4 % 6 %
Pillar 3 funded voluntary non-state pension funds investment yield - - -
Notes:
Sources:

















Pillar 1 PAYG mandatory




Pillar 1 PAYG mandatory
insured part
funded part investment yield
2 As the unified social tax is a regressive tax, these rates are applied for the low-income bracket whose salary is no more than 100,000 rubles per year. But the proportion of
contribution rate of pillar 1 and its two parts to that of pillar 2 is almost the same for other three higher-income brackets whose salaries are 100,000-300,000 rubles, 300,000-
600,000 rubles and more than 600,000 rubles, respectively. The contribution rate for pillar 2 for cohort C is to be 3% in 2002-2003, 4% in 2004, and 5% in 2005. The
contribution rate for the insured part of pillar 1 is the difference between 14% and the contribution rate for pillar 2.
3 As the unified social tax is a regressive tax, these rates are applied for the low-income bracket whose salary is no more than 280,000 rubles per year. But the proportion of
contribution rate of pillar 1 and its two parts to that of pillar 2 is almost the same for other two higher-income brackets whose salaries are 280,000-600,000 rubles and more than
600,000 rubles, respectively.
1 Cohort A includes men born in 1952 and earlier women born in 1956 and earlier, destined to retire until 2012 for men and until 2011 for women; cohort B includes men born in
1953-1966 and women born in 1957-1966; and cohort C includes both men and women born after 1967. Cohort C will retire after 2022 for women and after 2027 for men.
Table 5. Dependency Ratio of Russia











N/A (%) M/B (%)
1990 83,976 28,195 ŋŋŋ 32,848 33.6 ŋŋŋ ŋŋŋ 116.5
1991 83,892 28,714 ŋŋŋ 34,044 34.2 ŋŋŋ ŋŋŋ 118.6
1992 83,748 29,348 71,068 35,273 35.0 49.6 84.9 120.2
1993 83,767 29,696 68,642 36,100 35.5 52.6 81.9 121.6
1994 84,059 29,931 64,785 36,623 35.6 56.5 77.1 122.4
1995 84,209 30,197 64,149 37,083 35.9 57.8 76.2 122.8
1996 84,337 30,500 62,928 37,827 36.2 60.1 74.6 124.0
1997 84,786 30,587 60,021 38,184 36.1 63.6 70.8 124.8
1998 85,548 30,445 58,437 38,410 35.6 65.7 68.3 126.2
1999 86,332 30,175 63,082 38,381 35.0 60.8 73.1 127.2
2000 87,054 29,885 64,465 38,411 34.3 59.6 74.1 128.5
2001 87,329 29,860 64,664 38,630 34.2 59.7 74.0 129.4
2002 89,206 29,643 65,858 38,432 33.2 58.4 73.8 129.6
2003 89,896 29,258 66,606 38,164 32.5 57.3 74.1 130.4
2004 88,950 29,171 65,905 38,051 32.8 57.7 74.1 130.4
2005 89,098 29,101 66,015 37,959 32.7 57.5 74.1 130.4
2006 88,800 29,286 65,794 38,201 33.0 58.1 74.1 130.4
2007 88,226 29,556 65,369 38,553 33.5 59.0 74.1 130.4
2008 87,457 29,813 64,799 38,888 34.1 60.0 74.1 130.4
2009 86,289 30,255 63,933 39,464 35.1 61.7 74.1 130.4
2010 85,194 30,649 63,122 39,978 36.0 63.3 74.1 130.4
2011 84,028 31,046 62,258 40,496 36.9 65.0 74.1 130.4
2012 82,764 31,480 61,322 41,062 38.0 67.0 74.1 130.4
2013 81,462 31,909 60,357 41,622 39.2 69.0 74.1 130.4
2014 80,142 32,379 59,379 42,235 40.4 71.1 74.1 130.4
2015 78,757 32,843 58,353 42,840 41.7 73.4 74.1 130.4
Notes:
A: men at 16-59, women at 16-54.
B: men at 60 or older, women at 55 or older.
N: Based on a sample survey of employment conducted, mostly, at the end of October or November. 
Sources:
Until 2003: 
A & B: For 1990, 1994-2001: RSE, 2002, p. 81: 1991-2000, RSE, 2001, p. 81; 2002-2003: RSE, 2004, p. 77.
N: For 1992-2000: RSE, 2001, p. 133; 1992, 1995-2003: RSE, 2004, p. 133.
M: For 1992-2000: RSE, 2001, p. 197; 1992, 1995-2003: RSE, 2004, p. 187.
After 2004: 
A & B: Predpolozhitel'naia , 2002, p. 55.
N & M: Calculated from A & B and the assumed values of E & F
E & F: Assumed to be equal to the value in 2003.











1992 49.5 12.2 26.0 5.6
1993 51.5 16.7 33.9 4.3
1994 54.3 18.3 35.6 5.6
1995 55.6 18.5 39.8 16.5
1996 56.8 19.0 38.2 12.6
1997 58.8 16.9 34.0 15.3
1998 60.2 19.4 36.0 10.6
1999 59.9 16.0 29.5 9.4
2000 59.5 16.3 31.2 12.1
2001 59.5 17.5 31.6 7.0
2002 58.8 17.1 31.6 8.2
2003 58.5 15.9 29.8 8.6
2004 57.5 15.9 30.9 10.5
2005 57.6 11.4 30.4 35.0
2006 57.8 11.4 30.3 35.0
2007 58.5 11.4 29.9 35.0
2008 59.5 11.4 29.4 35.0
2009 60.9 11.4 28.8 35.0
2010 62.5 11.4 28.0 35.0
2011 64.2 11.4 27.3 35.0
2012 66.0 11.4 26.5 35.0
2013 68.0 11.4 25.8 35.0
2014 70.0 11.4 25.0 35.0
2015 72.3 11.4 24.2 35.0
Sources:
Until 2003:
α: Calculated from the formula, α=β(M/N)(1-τ).
β: E of Table 2.
After 2004: 
M/N: The yearly simple average calculated from D of Table 5.
β: Calculated from the formula, β=α(N/M)/(1-τ).
τ: The percentage of revenues of the PFR other than contribution and obtained from Table 8.
τ: For 2004 planned figure; 2005: planned figure, excluding expenditure on payments to veterans, invalids and others;
2006-2015: arbitrary.
α: For 2004 assumed to be equal to the value in 2003; 2005-2015: assumed to be equal to the value in 2003 multiplied
M/N: Calculated from N/M (For 1992-2000: RSE 2001, p. 197; 1992, 1995-2003: RSE, 2004, p. 187).
Table 7. Budgets of the State and the Pension Fund of Russia
(in billion new rubles)
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
State budget Revenue 5.3 49.7 172.4 437.0 558.8 711.6 686.8 1,213.6 2,097.7 2,683.7 3,519.2 4,138.7 ŋŋŋ ŋŋŋ
Expenditure 6.0 57.7 230.4 486.1 652.7 839.5 842.1 1,258.0 1,960.1 2,419.4 3,422.3 3,964.9 ŋŋŋ ŋŋŋ
Balance 0.6 7.9 65.5 -49.1 -94.2 -127.9 -155.3 -44.4 137.6 264.3 97.0 173.8 ŋŋŋ ŋŋŋ
PFR Revenue 1.3 10.6 38.3 88.3 131.7 178.3 166.7 276.5 431.3 532.1 699.9 843.1 1,000.3 1,177.4
Expenditure 0.9 10.4 37.3 88.7 129.6 176.6 167.0 271.4 341.1 514.8 684.1 804.1 946.6 1,176.1
Balance 0.4 0.2 1.0 -0.4 2.1 1.7 -0.3 5.1 90.2 17.3 15.7 39.1 53.7 1.2
GDP 19.0 171.5 610.7 1,428.5 2,007.8 2,342.5 2,629.6 4,823.2 7,305.6 8,943.6 10,817.5 13,201.1 16,778.8 18,720.0
(in percent of GDP)
State budget Revenue 27.9 29.0 28.2 30.6 27.8 30.4 26.1 25.2 28.7 30.0 32.5 31.4 ŋŋŋ ŋŋŋ
Expenditure 31.6 33.6 37.7 34.0 32.5 35.8 32.0 26.1 26.8 27.1 31.6 30.0 ŋŋŋ ŋŋŋ
Balance 3.4 4.6 10.7 -3.4 -4.7 -5.5 -5.9 -0.9 1.9 3.0 0.9 1.3 ŋŋŋ ŋŋŋ
PFR Revenue 6.7 6.2 6.3 6.2 6.6 7.6 6.3 5.7 5.9 5.9 6.5 6.4 6.0 6.3
Expenditure 4.8 6.1 6.1 6.2 6.5 7.5 6.4 5.6 4.7 5.8 6.3 6.1 5.6 6.3
Balance 1.9 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 1.2 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.0
Sources: 
State budget: For 1992-2003, RSE, 2004, pp. 563-564.
PFR: For 1992-2000, RSE, 2001, p. 533; 1992, 1995-2001, 2003: RSE, 2004, p. 570; 2002: Table 8; 2004-2005: planned figures in the PFR budget law.
Balance of the PFR is calculated as revenue minus expenditure. 
GDP: For 1992-1994, Natsional'nye, 2000, p. 27; 1995-2004: Rosstat's site; 2005: planned figure in the federal budget law.
Table 8. Balance of the Pension Fund of Russia
(in million rubles)
1999 2000 2001 2002 2004 2005
actual actual actual actual planned actual planned  planned 
A Balance as of January 1, total 3,000 8,097 98,322 115,605 154,051 ŋŋŋ 179,203 260,786
A1 Current budget 3,000 8,097 98,322 115,605 114,100 ŋŋŋ 90,310 97,140
A2 Financial resources for the funded part ŋŋŋ ŋŋŋ ŋŋŋ 0 39,951 ŋŋŋ 88,893 163,646
B Revenue 276,519 431,281 532,120 699,871 822,841 843,141 1,000,317 1,177,375
B1 ɹContribution 250,436 379,259 494,906 642,328 742,350 770,457 895,616 986,132
B11 Unified social taxes transferred from federal budget ŋŋŋ ŋŋŋ ŋŋŋ 331,603 365,640 ŋŋŋ 438,210 341,170
B12 Insured part ŋŋŋ ŋŋŋ ŋŋŋ 261,002 327,240 ŋŋŋ 380,374 561,440
B13 Funded part ŋŋŋ ŋŋŋ ŋŋŋ 37,865 49,470 ŋŋŋ 76,887 81,670
B14 Other ŋŋŋ ŋŋŋ ŋŋŋ 11,858 0 ŋŋŋ 145 1,852
B2 ɹFrom federal budget other than unified social taxes 17,700 26,800 34,039 49,492 50,322 50,979 59,499 64,999
B3 ɹOther 8,383 25,222 3,175 8,051 30,169 21,705 45,202 126,244
C Expenditure 271,422 341,056 514,837 684,136 809,196 804,076 946,640 1,176,131
C1 ɹPension payment 254,710 331,257 491,123 661,730 779,896 776,446 901,230 1,125,311
C11 Basic part ŋŋŋ ŋŋŋ ŋŋŋ ŋŋŋ 268,187 ŋŋŋ 301,335 340,997
C12 Insured part ŋŋŋ ŋŋŋ ŋŋŋ ŋŋŋ 460,473 ŋŋŋ 540,032 617,589
C13 Payments to veterans, invalids and others ŋŋŋ ŋŋŋ ŋŋŋ ŋŋŋ ŋŋŋ ŋŋŋ ŋŋŋ 99,764
C14 Other ŋŋŋ ŋŋŋ ŋŋŋ ŋŋŋ 51,236 ŋŋŋ 59,863 66,961
C2 ɹOther 16,712 9,799 23,714 22,406 29,300 27,630 45,410 50,820
C21 Funded part ŋŋŋ ŋŋŋ ŋŋŋ 442 818 ŋŋŋ 10,242 4,810
C22 Maintenance of the PFR ŋŋŋ ŋŋŋ ŋŋŋ 16,429 22,832 ŋŋŋ 26,228 33,861
C23 Other ŋŋŋ ŋŋŋ ŋŋŋ 5,535 5,650 ŋŋŋ 8,940 12,149
D Balance as of December 31, total 8,097 98,322 115,605 145,014 156,795 ŋŋŋ 209,076 262,029
D1 Current budget 8,097 98,322 115,605 106,041 61,143 ŋŋŋ 46,758 14,284
D2 Financial resources for the funded part ŋŋŋ ŋŋŋ ŋŋŋ 38,973 95,652 ŋŋŋ 162,318 247,745
E Revenue minus expenditure 5,097 90,225 17,283 15,735 13,645 39,065 53,677 1,244
E1 Excluding those related to the funded part ŋŋŋ ŋŋŋ ŋŋŋ -23,238 -42,056 ŋŋŋ -19,748 -82,855
E2 Those related to the funded part ŋŋŋ ŋŋŋ ŋŋŋ 38,973 55,701 ŋŋŋ 73,425 84,099
(in percent of total)
B Revenue 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
B1 ɹContribution 90.6 87.9 93.0 91.8 90.2 91.4 89.5 83.8
B11 Unified social taxes transferred from federal budget ŋŋŋ ŋŋŋ ŋŋŋ 47.4 44.4 ŋŋŋ 43.8 29.0
B12 Insured part ŋŋŋ ŋŋŋ ŋŋŋ 37.3 39.8 ŋŋŋ 38.0 47.7
B13 Funded part ŋŋŋ ŋŋŋ ŋŋŋ 5.4 6.0 ŋŋŋ 7.7 6.9
B14 Other ŋŋŋ ŋŋŋ ŋŋŋ 1.7 0.0 ŋŋŋ 0.0 0.2
B2 ɹFrom federal budget other than unified social taxes 6.4 6.2 6.4 7.1 6.1 6.0 5.9 5.5
B3 ɹOther 3.0 5.8 0.6 1.2 3.7 2.6 4.5 10.7
C Expenditure 98.2 79.1 96.8 97.8 98.3 95.4 94.6 99.9
C1 ɹPension payment 92.1 76.8 92.3 94.6 94.8 92.1 90.1 95.6
C11 Basic part ŋŋŋ ŋŋŋ ŋŋŋ ŋŋŋ 32.6 ŋŋŋ 30.1 29.0
C12 Insured part ŋŋŋ ŋŋŋ ŋŋŋ ŋŋŋ 56.0 ŋŋŋ 54.0 52.5
C13 Payments to veterans, invalids and others ŋŋŋ ŋŋŋ ŋŋŋ ŋŋŋ ŋŋŋ ŋŋŋ ŋŋŋ 8.5
C14 Other ŋŋŋ ŋŋŋ ŋŋŋ ŋŋŋ 6.2 ŋŋŋ 6.0 5.7
C2 ɹOther 6.0 2.3 4.5 3.2 3.6 3.3 4.5 4.3
C21 Funded part ŋŋŋ ŋŋŋ ŋŋŋ 0.1 0.1 ŋŋŋ 1.0 0.4
C22 Maintenance of the PFR ŋŋŋ ŋŋŋ ŋŋŋ 2.3 2.8 ŋŋŋ 2.6 2.9
C23 Other ŋŋŋ ŋŋŋ ŋŋŋ 0.8 0.7 ŋŋŋ 0.9 1.0
Sources:
A (A1), B, B1, B2, C, C1, D(D1): For 1999-2001,  RSE, 2004, p. 570.
A=A1+A2 for 2002, 2003(planned), 2004-2005. 
A1, B, B1, B11, B12, B13, B2, C, C1, C11, C12, C13, C21, C22, D1: For planned figures (2003-2005), PFR budget laws.
A1, B, B1, B11, B12, B13, B2, C, C21, C22, D1: For 2002, PFR budget execution law.
A1, B, B1, B2, C, C1: For 2003(actual), RSE, 2004, p. 570.
A2: A of Table 9.
B14, B3, C14, C2, C23: Calculated as residual. 
C1: For 2002, RSE, 2004, p. 570.
D=D1+D2 for 2002, 2003(planned), 2004-2005. 
D2: D of Table 9.
E=B-C
E1=E-E2
E2: E of Table 9.
2003
(in million rubles)
2002 2003 2004 2005
actual planned planned planned
A Balance as of January 1 0 39,951 88,893 163,646
B Revenue 39,415 56,520 83,667 88,910
B1 Contribution 37,865 49,470 76,887 81,670
B2 Investment income 1,524 7,050 6,780 7,044
B3 Other 26 0 0 196
C Expenditure 442 819 10,242 4,811
C1 Transfer to non-state pension funds 0 0 9,062 3,335
C2 Other 442 819 1,180 1,476
D Balance as of December 31 38,973 95,652 162,318 247,745
E Annual increase in balance 38,973 55,701 73,425 84,099
F1 Investment yield (%) B2/A ŋŋŋ 17.6 7.6 4.3
F2 Investment yield (%) B2/D 3.9 7.4 4.2 2.8
(in percent of total)
B Revenue 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
B1 Contribution 96.1 87.5 91.9 91.9
B2 Investment income 3.9 12.5 8.1 7.9
B3 Other 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.2
C Expenditure 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
C1 Transfer to non-state pension funds 0.0 0.0 88.5 69.3
C2 Other 100.0 100.0 11.5 30.7
Notes:








A, B, B1, B2, C1, D: For 2002, PFR budget execution law; 2003-2004: PFR budget laws.
Table 9. Balance of Financial Resources for the Payment of the Funded Part of the Pension Fund of
Russia
